Targets and Fisheries Management in the Asia and Pacific Region by Chu, Hoang Long & Kompas, Thomas
Policy Forum Article
Targets and Fisheries Management in the Asia and
Pacific Region
Long Chu and Tom Kompas*
Abstract
Marine fisheries in the Asia and the Pacific
region play an important role in global,
regional and national economies. Many of the
fisheries in the region are over-exploited, both
biologically and economically. We focus on the
use of appropriate fishery targets, and the
importance of tying those targets to manage-
ment objectives to overcome the usual and
unwanted negative externalities that occur in
ocean fisheries, the ones that result in substan-
tial over-fishing. Of particular importance is
the use of a maximum economic yield target
for both short- and long-lived species.
Maximum economic yield, when combined
with appropriately designed marine protected
areas, or marine reserves, not only provides
maximum profitability and generally larger
and more ‘conservationist’ stocks of fish, but it
also ensures a measure of resilience from sto-
chastic shocks that may negatively impact the
fishery. It remains the preferred target for most
fisheries in the Asia and Pacific region.
Key words: fisheries targets, maximum eco-
nomic yield, maximum sustainable yield, Asia
and the Pacific, fisheries management
1. Introduction
Marine fisheries are an important part of the
world’s economy, with a total catch of 80
million tons of fish in 2009, and providing 34
million jobs and nutrition to at least three
billion people in 2008 (FAO 2010). Forty
per cent of the world’s marine fisheries are
located in the Asia and the Pacific region, cov-
ering three main fishing zones—the Northwest
Pacific, the Western Central Pacific and the
Southwest Pacific—with a combined total
surface area of 80.6 million km2 and a catch of
31.8 million tons in 2009 (Bianchi & Fletcher
2011; Yatsu & Ye 2011; Ye 2011). Marine
fishing activities contribute a sizeable share of
income to the gross domestic product (GDP)
of many countries, especially small Pacific
island countries, where fish production
accounts for as much as 60 per cent of GDP.
Recognising the importance of these marine
resources and the ‘tragedy of the commons’
associated with them—without regulation, the
tendency for overexploitation and dissipated
rents or returns to the fishery—has resulted in
a significant desire to manage these fisheries
more properly. Unfortunately, success has
been limited. For example, in the Northwest
Pacific zone, with three management agree-
ments among Japan, China and the Republic of
Korean in place, 3 out of the 17 species (or
groups of species) have been classified as
overfished (FAO 2011). In the Western Central
Pacific zone, where many countries have
established fishing ‘management areas’, many
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of the key species remain overexploited, espe-
cially high-value species like big eye and
yellowfin tuna (Kompas et al. 2010). In the
South, where Australia and New Zealand are
key participants, three key species are
overfished. The failings of fisheries manage-
ment in these cases are generally due to
complicated transnational governance arrange-
ments, poorly performing catch targets, and
the loose connection between management
targets and the instruments used to obtain them
(Grafton et al. 2006a; Kompas & Che 2006;
Kompas et al. 2010; Yatsu & Ye 2011).
In order to obtain more effective manage-
ment outcomes, some management authorities
have imposed a maximum sustainable yield
(MSY) target. MSY is defined as the
maximum sustainable catch of a species,
essentially drawing off net additions to the
stock of fish, guaranteeing that the resource is
not depleted over time. This concept is appeal-
ing, so much so it is explicitly stipulated as the
appropriate target in existing global treaties on
fishing (for example, United Nations Conven-
tion on the Law of the Sea, Food and Agricul-
tural Organization (FAO) Code of Conduct for
Responsible Fisheries) and at the regional
level by the largest fisheries management
authority, the Western and Central Pacific
Fisheries Commission (FAO 2013), as well as
being supported by some notable marine
researchers (for example, Christensen 2010).
While MSY is clearly a target that can
guarantee the sustainability of a resource, it is
also clear that this target does not maximise
the economic benefits from fishing. MSY is a
parameter intrinsic to the biology of a
species. It is not connected to the fundamen-
tal economic incentives that result in fishing
activity, for example, how much it costs to
have fish landed and how much we value the
fish when caught. This lack of economic fun-
damentals in the MSY target not only
diminishes its appeal but also results in an
economically inefficient allocation of
resources. In terms of the economics, at given
fish prices, the target would only be correct
when and if the cost of fishing is zero or con-
stant as fishing effort increases, both of which
are a practical impossibility.
When it comes to the sustainability objective
itself, MSY is also not the best among the many
targets that guarantee sustainable outcomes. In
fact, any target that maximises the long-term
economic benefits from fishing will have to
meet a sustainability objective, simply because
the economic incentives for fishing vanish
when the stock of fish becomes too low and cost
of fishing rises considerably (Grafton et al.
2007, 2010). Moreover, it has been shown that
the stock that generates the maximum eco-
nomic yield (MEY)—a target that creates the
largest difference between discounted revenues
and costs over time—is usually well above the
stock of fish consistent with MSY (Grafton
et al. 2011). MEY, in other words, results in
larger stocks of fish and is thus a better target
than MSY in terms of both the economics and
the goals of marine conservation.
In the following sections, we will address
some key points with regard to targets for
marine fisheries in the Asia and the Pacific
region. We will first summarise four of the
aspects associated with a ‘tragedy of the
commons’ in fisheries (often referred to as
‘externalities’), and then analyse how an
appropriate target needs to respond to these
externalities. Our objective is not to make light
of the technical and practical complications
needed to determine a proper target from an
optimal fishing model (Dichmont et al. 2010),
but rather to confirm that an appropriate target
for fisheries management should provide a
more direct and clear connection between
management objectives and the associated
management target. This will always involve
connecting the biology of the fishery to its
economics.
2. Externalities in Fisheries Exploitation
Externalities in fisheries occur when the har-
vesting activity of a single fisher has negative
impacts on the rest of the fishing community
(and even the society as a whole), and where
these impacts are not fully taken into account
in the individual decision to fish. There are
four types of externalities, and each of them, if
present, must be taken into account when
determining the best fisheries target.
Asia & the Pacific Policy Studies September 2014616
© 2014 The Authors. Asia and the Pacific Policy Studies
published by Wiley Publishing Asia Pty Ltd and Crawford School of Public Policy at The Australian National University
2.1 Stock Effects
The stock externality is the one most often
mentioned in fisheries research and present
in all fisheries, at least at some point in
their evolution. It arises when the catch of
any fisher reduces the stock of fish and
thus lowers the current catch rate for the
remaining fishers. In other words, an increase
in the catch by one fisher will, under these
circumstances, make fishing harder and
more costly for others. This effect occurs
especially at low or already ‘fished-down’
stock levels.
2.2 Congestion Effects
In some fisheries, fishing activity is especially
concentrated in small or restricted areas and
times of the year. In these cases, it is common
for congestion effects to occur, with obstruc-
tions in fishing lines and increased costs
associated with proximate fishing activities
resulting in delays and added costs. Salmon
fisheries in the Pacific coastal fisheries in
North America and long-liners in the North
Atlantic, where fishing activity can be intense
and often concentrated in a very few days,
often experience this effect.
2.3 Dynamic Effects
Another externality, also commonly men-
tioned in fisheries research, is the dynamic
effect of an individual catch. This externality
occurs when the catch in 1 year affects the
stock available in the following years, princi-
pally through altering the recruitment process
or by reduced amounts of spawning stock.
Unlike the stock effect, the dynamic external-
ity does not always exist in every fishery. For
species with a short lifespan, for example, it is
often the case that a catch in any given year
does not affect the stock in subsequent years.
Shrimps and prawns in the Western Central
and Southwest Pacific fishing zones are prac-
tical examples of this kind of short-lived
species.
2.4 Price Effects
The third externality that an individual fisher
imposes on the fishing community as a whole
is through changes in the price of fish. Fish,
like many other consumption goods, is subject
to a law of demand that stipulates that consum-
ers are only willing to pay less for any addi-
tional fish supplied or brought to market. The
law of demand, thus, implies that an increase
in the catch by any one fisher will reduce the
average price paid to others. This price exter-
nality depends on how responsive the price of
fish is to catch. A so-called elastic price elas-
ticity of demand will result in a large price
effect, where a moderate increase in the catch
will result in a substantial reduction in the
price. On the other hand, if the price of fish is
relatively insensitive to the catch, the effect
will be small.
2.5 Technology Effects
Technological progress in the harvesting
sector will likely increase catchability, making
fishing costs comparatively cheaper and often
increasing the incentive to expand fishing
effort, as other vessels race to use the new
technology (Squires & Vestergaard 2013). The
extent of this externality depends on the
regulatory instrument in place. In fisheries
managed by effort controls, in particular, tech-
nological change results in increases in fishing
power, ‘effort creep’ and decreases in the stock
of fish. In systems regulated by individual
transferrable quotas, or ITQs, on the other
hand, the effect is simply to lower costs and
increase profitability (Grafton et al. 2006a).
The catch target maintains stocks.
2.6 Uncertainty Effects
The fourth externality is that which results
from the uncertain effects from harvest that
impact the fishery. Fish stocks are always
subject to uncertainties, both positive and
negative. Weather effects are a good example.
But harvesting activities may also increase the
probability and magnitude of negative shocks
Chu and Kompas: Targets and Fisheries Management 617
© 2014 The Authors. Asia and the Pacific Policy Studies
published by Wiley Publishing Asia Pty Ltd and Crawford School of Public Policy at The Australian National University
to the fishery. The negative shocks can origi-
nate not only from directly harmful activities,
such as trawling near the ocean floor, discard-
ing of fish or the spread of disease, but also
from accidental occurrences in the fishery.
Evidence for such effects can be found in Goni
(1998), Turner et al. (1999) and Jennings et al.
(2001).
3. Dealing with Externalities with the
Right Target
Externalities, if not appropriately managed or
regulated, will result in an inefficient expan-
sion of fishing effort and a drain of economic
rent from the marine resource. What is the best
management target to effectively deal with
these externalities? Specific calculation of
the optimal target often requires technical
bioeconomic models, but it can also some-
times be as simple as calculating a breakeven
point to maximise profitability (for example,
Kompas & Chu 2013). Nevertheless, the fun-
damental principles in determining the best
target for fisheries management are clear.
3.1 MSY and MEY
There is an ongoing debate about whether
MSY is the most economically efficient target
not only for the fishery, but for the society as a
whole. For example, Christensen (2010)
claims that, given the importance of the off-
shore processing of fish in the value chain,
MSY will maximise the social benefit. But
both Grafton et al. (2011) and Sumaila and
Hannesson (2010) provide clear counter-
examples. Grafton et al. (2011), in particular,
using an MEY model that both incorporates
offshore processing and accounts for con-
sumer surplus from the sale of fish, emphasise
that the stock of fish at MSY is generally too
small to ensure that fishing costs are at the
socially optimal level. The cost of fishing at
MEY compared with MSY is lower, put
simply, since fish stocks are larger. A similar
conclusion is drawn from Sumaila and
Hannesson (2010), who show that in an
economy where all resources are fully utilised,
further value added in the value chain for fish
is an additional cost and has the effect of
reducing fishing effort and optimum yield,
rather than increasing it.
All practical bioeconomic models have, thus
far, drawn the conclusion that the fishing effort
that maximises the total benefit at MEY is
usually smaller than the effort required to
maintain the resource at MSY (Kompas et al.
2010; Grafton et al. 2011). This is a result of
the stock externality, or the stock effect, that
implies that the catch rate deteriorates when
the stock of fish falls. For long-lived species, in
particular, with dynamic effects, sustainable
outcomes can be obtained only if catch is sus-
tainable (at intrinsic growth rates), and the eco-
nomic surplus associated with each sustainable
outcome depends not only on the catch
(revenue) but also on fishing effort (cost).
Without effective management to guarantee
this outcome, externalities would induce an
effort expansion until all economic profit is
either gone or at least smaller than at MEY. If
price effects are present, this is doubly impor-
tant, since harvests larger than MEY can, in
this case, lower price and thus revenues.
This too is why targeting fisheries at MSY
does not maximise the surplus from a marine
resource, unless fishing costs are zero or con-
stant with increases in effort, and the price of
fish is fixed. While generating the highest sus-
tainable catch (and hence revenue), MSY fails
to take into account how much cost must be
incurred to land the expected level of catch, as
well as the effect of potential changes in the
price of fish with changes in catch. Further-
more, starting from MSY, a reduction in the
effort will cause both revenue and costs to fall,
but the cost of fishing generally falls faster due
to the stock and dynamic externalities. The
exact position for optimal and sustainable
harvest depends on specific parameters, but a
‘win–win’ outcome where both net surplus and
fish stocks are larger than those at MSY is
common in practice.
The only factor that can possibly reverse
this effect is the interest rate (Grafton et al.
2007; Chu et al. 2013). In a fishery with an
existing small stock, a relatively large interest
rate discourages fishers from waiting until
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stocks are rebuilt before fishing. Likewise, in a
fishery with an existing abundant stock and
low rates of biological growth, a high interest
rate creates an incentive for fishers to quickly
fish down a stock of fish, especially in cases
where the interest earned in the ‘bank’ exceeds
the biological growth rate of fish. However, the
influence of the interest rate is limited. Low
growth rate fish stocks are expensive to find
and harvest when stocks are low, and the inter-
est rate rarely overcomes the effect of falling
stocks on the cost of fishing; the cost of fishing
and the stock effect always dominate. Grafton
et al. (2010, 2011) nicely show this effect,
demonstrating that under reasonable condi-
tions, optimal fishing effort is always smaller
than that at MSY, regardless of the interest
rate. These exact conditions are met in many
fisheries, including those for the most valuable
tuna species in the Asia and the Pacific region
(Kompas et al. 2010).
3.2 Targeting Long-Lived versus
Short-Lived Species
The difference in the dynamic effects between
a long-lived and a short-lived species should
be considered when determining a manage-
ment target. The stock of a long-lived species,
with significant dynamic effects in place, will
be very much subject to a catch history, along
with environmental factors. Therefore, the
right target for a long-lived species must take
into account the dynamic effects of fishing.
This requires the construction of a dynamic
bioeconomic model (for example, Kompas
et al. 2010, 2011).
A short-lived species, on the other hand, is
free from dynamic effects, but that does not
imply that determining a target for short-lived
species is easy. Stock levels for most short-
lived species are often affected by such things
as the weather and other environmental
factors, and the catch target must reflect this.
The challenge here is that while it is relatively
straightforward to qualitatively evaluate what
are good and bad ‘weather states’, quantitative
forecasts on how these states will influence the
exploitable biomass or stock of fish are much
harder to calculate.
Recent studies suggest ways to overcome
this challenge. Statistical models (for example,
Zhou et al. 2008; Venables et al. 2011;
Buckworth et al. 2014) and mathematical
models (for example, Kompas & Chu 2013)
have been developed to determine the quanti-
tative relationship between maximum avail-
able catch and factors such as rainfall, river
flows and other environmental conditions. This
work can help predict the optimal catch given
how the weather and environmental factors
unfold overtime, thus providing an accurate
prediction of optimal catch for a short-lived
species contingent on weather data. The tech-
niques are complicated here, but of good use to
fisheries managers in Asia and the Pacific. In
terms of the catch target, this is straightfor-
ward: with an absence of stock and dynamic
externalities, MEY is preferred. It simply and
clearly maximises profit.
3.3 The Role of Marine Protected Areas
(MPAs) in Fisheries Targeting
MPAs have been a valued conservation
measure for some time. These reserves act as
an important tourist destination and facilitate
research into ocean effects and ecosystem
design. It was first thought that MPAs would
lower the economic benefit or profit from
fishing, simply because they restrict the fishing
opportunities that would otherwise be avail-
able without the reserves. However, a recent
strand of research has found that no-fishing
zones can instead improve economic profit-
ability in environments where fish stocks are
subject to the externalities that stem from the
effects of uncertainty.
MPAs, when appropriately enforced,
provide two economic benefits. First, they
reduce the vulnerability of the fish stock to
harmful shocks, directly or indirectly caused
by fishing activities, since the stock of fish
inside the protected areas is largely exempt
from the fishing-related activity. Second, and
perhaps more importantly, fish stocks inside
MPAs act as an important buffer to negative
shocks in the fishery, allowing for a transfer of
fish from the reserve to the fishing area. Fish
stocks inside MPAs, in other words, where
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population density is higher, will migrate to
fishing areas and help the exploitable stock and
catch recover more quickly after a shock
(Grafton et al. 2005, 2006b). This buffer effect
is precisely why profits are higher with MPAs,
even though some parts of available fishing
grounds are closed. Evidence for these kinds
of benefits is already available, and high-
lighted, for example, by effects of weather-
induced shocks for some species in the
Northwest Pacific zone (Yatsu & Ye 2011),
and from the concerns over the damages from
longer term climatic effects on surface tem-
peratures and ocean acidification (Bahri &
Cochrane 2011). A recent study (Chu et al.
2013) suggests that the flexible management
of MPAs (that is, changing their location and
the temporary opening of an MPA) may make
profitability even larger with reserves.
4. Conclusion
The important role of marine fisheries in the
Asia and the Pacific region makes it essential
to effectively manage them and to clearly
connect catch targets to management objec-
tives. While acknowledging the technical com-
plexities in determining a perfect target, we
emphasise that effective management must be
able to reflect the true costs and benefits
obtained from the use of the fishery.
Approaches to determining an effective target
in practice vary enormously, contingent on the
kinds of negative externalities existing in each
specific situation. But one of the fundamental
principles we find is that conservation mea-
sures are most often (and should be) consistent
with economic objectives.
In this sense, MEY is a crucial choice for
most fisheries in the region. First, a MEY
target maximises profits (or resource rents)
regardless of changes in the price of fish or
the cost of fishing. Profits may be low when
the price of fish is low and costs high, but
they will still be maximised under this target.
With the right instrument in place, a MEY
target will also ensure that the costs of har-
vesting are minimised at the MEY target
level, improving the international competi-
tiveness of regional fisheries. Second, a MEY
target is a sustainable harvest, and as such is
preferable to a MSY. If sustainability is the
goal, as it should be, it makes sense to select
a sustainable yield that guarantees the largest
resource rents or profitability regardless of
market conditions. Depending on prices and
costs, profits can be zero or even negative at
MSY. Third, at most biological growth rates,
as well as practical discount rates and costs of
harvesting, a MEY target will imply a stock of
fish larger than that consistent with MSY. In
this sense, MEY is more ‘conservationist’
than MSY, and provides additional environ-
mental benefits and added resilience to
unforeseen environmental and harvest-related
shocks to the fishery.
All that is required is sufficient data to deter-
mine an MEY target. For short-lived species,
this may simply involve data on prices and the
costs of fishing. In more complicated fisheries,
estimates of the stock–recruitment relationship
are also needed. If unavailable, harvest-control
rules, such as stock values that are a given
percentage larger than MSY, or rules that
establish fishing limits as some maximum
fraction of estimated ‘virgin biomass’, may
also be sufficient.
Of course, an effective fishing target must
also be holistic and adaptive. It must take into
account stochastic effects from weather
and the unintended harmful effects and
uncertainties that go with fishing activity.
This is why MPAs are so important to any
management plan. When properly designed,
they also, with MEY, help achieve the
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